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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION REINVENTS ITSELF? 
Kristina Daugirdas* 
For most of  its history, the International Law Commission has been in the business of  producing draft 
articles. Yet, Sean Murphy’s coverage1 of  the Commission’s sixty-fifth session reveals that the Commission 
has decisively turned away from this format. As Jacob Katz Cogan’s earlier post observes,2 the Commission is 
demonstrating a new-found preference for outputs that are explicitly non-binding and betray no aspiration to 
form the basis for multilateral treaties. The Commission’s embrace of  alternative formats is a promising 
response to some of  the risks and criticisms associated with producing draft articles. But it is also an incom-
plete response. To ensure that its work continues to be relevant, ambitious, and influential, the Commission 
must revise its working methods as well as its outputs. In particular, the Commission should develop proce-
dures for engaging with and soliciting input from the non-state actors who are becoming an increasingly 
important audience for the Commission’s work. 
During the first half-century of  its existence, the Commission occupied itself  primarily with producing 
draft articles that formed the starting point for multilateral negotiations. This process generated some of  the 
most important treaties of  the twentieth century, including the Vienna Convention on the Law of  Treaties. 
These treaties in turn shaped the development of  customary international law on the topics they covered; 
many individual articles that were understood as progressive development at the time the Commission adopt-
ed them have subsequently been accepted as reflecting customary international law. 
But not every set of  draft articles proved to be a rousing success. One indicator that the Commission may 
have produced a dud is the failure of  a treaty based on the Commission’s work to attract many parties. Several 
years ago, José E. Alvarez3 tallied up the number of  ratifications each treaty based on ILC draft articles 
received within five years of  completion and found that eleven of  the Commission’s twenty-six treaty efforts 
garnered fewer than forty ratifications. Of  course, states may decline to become parties to these treaties for a 
variety of  reasons. Some of  these reflect badly on the Commission, but others do not. For example, it could 
be that states disagreed with the Commission’s ideas about how to progressively develop international law, 
and multilateral negotiations failed to significantly improve on the Commission’s work. It could also be that 
the Commission took on topics that did not merit the time and effort that ratification would require. Some 
thirty years ago, Tom Franck, Mohamed El Baradei, and Robert Trachtenberg co-authored a study4 observing 
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that a narrow focus on codification had converted the Commission’s agenda into “a veritable What’s What of  
drafting trivia, a parody of  the world’s urgent agenda.” 
Treaties with paltry numbers of  ratifications can also affect customary international law—by raising ques-
tions about whether any of  the treaty’s provisions reflect customary international law. This “decodifying” 
effect can be particularly pronounced for provisions that become the subject of  fiercely contested negotia-
tions. 
One way to avoid the sting of  rejection by states as well as any decodifying effect on customary interna-
tional law is to skip multilateral negotiations and simply allow the Commission’s draft articles to stand as a 
final product. As Professor Cogan describes,5 the Commission is increasingly asking the General Assembly to 
simply “take note” of  its draft articles instead of  arranging for multilateral negotiations. By taking this ap-
proach, the Commission can still influence state practice and the development of  customary international law. 
For example, states may conform their practice to the Commission’s draft articles, either because they believe 
that the articles already reflect customary international law or because they hope that those draft articles will 
come to reflect customary international law over time. 
This solution has its own problems, however. By presenting its draft articles as a final product, the Com-
mission is arguably legislating surreptitiously. That is, the Commission may be inviting harried international 
lawyers, judges, and arbitrators to assume that its articles codify extant customary international law, even when 
they include a large dose of  progressive development. This is troubling because progressive development 
involves controversial policy choices. As a body of  experts serving in their individual capacity, the Commis-
sion lacks legitimacy for making final decisions about how international law ought to change. 
In short, regardless of  whether they form the starting point for multilateral negotiations, draft articles offer 
a way for the Commission to make valuable contributions to international treaty and customary law. But they 
also involve risks for the Commission and for customary international law. These risks may explain why the 
Commission has turned away from draft articles. Of  the nine topics on the Commission’s work program for 
which at least a tentative decision has been made with respect to the form of  output, six will involve output 
other than draft articles. The Commission will likely produce guidelines for three topics (provisional applica-
tion of  treaties, protection of  the atmosphere, and probably protection of  the environment in relation to 
armed conflicts). For two additional topics, the Commission is planning to produce draft conclusions (identi-
fication of  customary international law and subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the 
interpretation of  treaties). Finally, for its work on most-favored-nation clauses, an ILC study group is produc-
ing a report that “might include guidelines or model clauses or, instead, simply analyze state practice regarding 
the writing of  MFN clauses and the interpretation that tribunals have given those various provisions.”6 
These non-treaty formats track key features of  the Commission’s Guide to Practice on Reservations to 
Treaties,7 adopted in 2011. The Guide suggests that by turning to non-treaty outputs, the Commission can 
remain ambitious and influential while avoiding some of  the risks associated with draft articles. 
Although it covers a fairly technical area of  international law, the Guide can be characterized as ambitious. 
The guide’s length (630 pages with commentaries) alone reflects the Commission’s striving to be comprehen-
sive. The Guide also does not shy away from addressing what is probably the most controversial issues related 
to treaty reservations: the competence of  human rights bodies to assess the validity of  reservations to human 
rights treaties. (Marko Milanovic and Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos describe what they characterize as the 
5 See Cogan, supra note 2. 
6 See Murphy, supra note 1. 
7 Rep. of  the Int’l Law Comm’n, 63d Sess., Apr. 26-June 3, July 4-Aug. 12, 2011, UN Doc. A/66/10; GAOR, 66th Sess., Supp. No. 
10 (2011). 
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Guide’s “remarkable compromise.”8) Finally, the non-treaty format of  the Guide allowed the Commission to 
include a number of  recommendations such as: “A reservation should, to the extent possible, indicate the 
reasons why it is being formulated.” Draft treaty texts have no place for such exhortations—and yet if  they 
are followed, such recommendations can improve treaty practice. 
Through the Guide, the Commission seeks to amplify its influence by reaching a broader audience than its 
draft articles typically do. The Guide’s avowed purpose is to “provide assistance to practitioners of  interna-
tional law.” The Commission describes the Guide as a “toolbox” where practitioners can find answers to 
various practical questions related to reservations. This is a difference from the Commission’s draft articles, 
but it is one of  degree; the intended audience for draft articles also included practitioners. In fact, both states 
and members of  the Commission anticipated9 that the draft articles on state responsibility would be influen-
tial without becoming a treaty precisely because they would be cited by international judges and arbitrators. 
Finally, the Commission’s decision to label the Guide as non-binding can help to deflect charges of  surrepti-
tious legislation. The Guide still blends codification and progressive development: as the Commission 
explains in the introduction to the Guide, some provisions in the guidelines reflect “rules the customary 
nature of  which is hardly in doubt,” while the customary nature of  other rules is “open to question.” The 
non-binding label nevertheless makes it harder for those relying on the Guide to simply assume that its 
provisions reflect customary international law. 
And yet, if  this year’s work program is an indication of  how the Commission is reinventing itself, that rein-
vention remains incomplete. The Commission’s embrace of  new formats has not been matched by 
innovations in its working methods. Most importantly, the Commission remains largely sealed off  from 
private actors. There is no established mechanism for private practitioners, civil society organizations, or 
academics to engage with the Commission or contribute to its work. Some interactions between the Commis-
sion and these groups do occur—but their occurrence is idiosyncratic. In 2010, Steve Charnovitz10 sought to 
document the extent to which the Commission consulted civil society organizations. This information proved 
difficult to come by, but the bottom line was clear: the Commission rarely consulted with civil society organi-
zations. 
Input from non-state actors could be especially helpful for the Commission on two issues. First, such input 
could help the Commission determine how to approach particular topics. For example, the Commission has 
indicated that it hopes its current work on customary international law (producing a set of  conclusions with 
commentaries) will “serve as a guide to lawyers and judges who are not experts in public international law.”11 
It is difficult to see how the Commission can hope to achieve this “practical outcome” without consulting a 
broad cross-section of  practitioners. Consider, too, the Commission’s work on the protection of  the atmos-
phere. As Sean Murphy describes, the Commission is trying to walk a fine line on this topic. The Commission 
hopes to avoid imposing on existing treaty regimes and to avoid interfering with political negotiations on 
climate change, ozone depletion, and transboundary pollution. The Commission would be better positioned 
to navigate this delicate context by consulting with a broad range of  state and IO representatives as well as 
non-state actors. 
Second, when the Commission’s output on a particular topic is heavy on progressive development, non-
state actors ought to have an opportunity to comment on the Commission’s work before it becomes finalized. 
8 Marko Milanovic & Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, Reservations to Treaties: An Introduction, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1055, 1058 (2013)  
9 James Crawford, Special Rapporteur, Fourth Rep. on State Responsibility, Int’l L. Comm’n, UN Doc. A/CN.4/517 (Apr. 2, 
2001). 
10 Steve Charnovitz, New Opportunities for Nongovernmental Actors in the International Law Commission (2010). 
11 Rep. of  the Int’l Law Comm’n, 65th Sess., May 6-June 7, July 8-Aug. 9, 2013, UN Doc. A/68/10; GAOR, 68th Sess., Supp. No. 
10 (2013). 
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These comments could be particularly useful to the Commission because neither the Commission’s member-
ship nor its working methods give it particular advantages when it comes to formulating proposals about how 
international law ought to develop. 
Enlisting the participation of  non-state actors could not only improve the quality of  the Commission’s 
output, but also amplify the Commission’s influence. The Commission could attract the attention of  its 
audience before its work is completed. Individuals and organizations that participate in generating the Com-
mission’s work might develop a sense of  ownership that would make them more likely to rely on it later. To 
be sure, the Commission may also find itself  the object of  more scrutiny and more criticism as well—but 
hopefully that additional scrutiny and criticism would serve to further improve the Commission’s working 
methods and output. 
In sum, Sean Murphy’s report on the Commission’s sixty-fifth session offers some indications that the 
Commission is in the process of  reinventing itself. But that reinvention will remain incomplete so long as the 
Commission declines to update its working methods as well as its outputs. 
